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SOMETHING THERE IS THAT DOESN'T LOVE A
WALL*: REFLECTIONS ON THE HISTORY
OF NORTH CAROLINA'S RELIGIOUS
TEST FOR PUBLIC OFFICE
GARY R. GOVERTt
Decisions of the United States Supreme Court interpreting the es-
tablishment clause of the first amendment today provide the primary
focus for scholarly debate concerning the place of religion in American
public life. State constitutions and statutes, however, are an important
source of information on historical attitudes toward the interaction of
law and religion. In this Essay, Mr. Govert examines the history and
development of one such state law, the religious test for public office in
the North Carolina Constitution. Although he concludes that such re-
pressive laws have no place in a democracy, Mr. Govert contends that a
total separation of religious concerns from public life is neither possible
nor desirable. Because religion encompasses the expression of every in-
dividual's deepest convictions, it inevitably permeates all aspects of
American law and politics. Thus, Mr. Govert argues, the Supreme
Court's attempts to build a wall of separation between religion and gov-
ernment are futile. Rather than attempting to maintain an illusory wall
of separation, Mr. Govert suggests that the Supreme Court adopt an ap-
proach to the establishment clause that protects the rights of religious
minorities by prohibiting government from favoring or disfavoring par-
ticular religious groups.
I. INTRODUCTION
In August 1985, at a Roman Catholic gathering in Washington, D.C., Sec-
retary of Education William J. Bennett called for a "national conversation and
debate on the place of religious belief in our society."' A few weeks earlier the
United States Supreme Court had issued a set of rulings blocking state aid to
sectarian schools, 2 and Bennett was irate. The Court, he said, should stop re-
garding government involvement with religion "as something akin to entangle-
ment with an infectious disease."'3 The American people, Bennett added, must
* R. FROST, MENDING WALL, line 1 (1914).
t B.A. 1979, University of Pittsburgh; J.D. 1986, University of North Carolina at Chapel
Hill.
1. Address by Secretary Bennett, Knights of Columbus Supreme Council Meeting (Aug. 7,
1985) (available at Dep't of Educ., Washington, D.C.) [hereinafter cited as Address].
2. See Grand Rapids School Dist. v. Ball, 105 S. Ct. 3216 (1985); Aguilar v. Felton, 105 S. Ct.
3232 (1985). These decisions overturned programs under which public school employees taught
classes and provided other services in sectarian schools. The Court held that both programs violated
the establishment clause. See infra note 9.
3. Address, supra note 1, at 8.
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understand that "the fate of our democracy is intimately intertwined ... with
the vitality of the Judeo-Christian tradition." '4
Reaction to Bennett's speech was swift and predictable. A spokesman for
the lobby group People for the American Way suggested changing Bennett's title
to "secretary of evangelism."' 5 A college professor writing in The New Republic
charged that "defenders of religion want the government to take sides" 6 in sup-
port of those who assert "that belief in God [is] not open to question."' 7 Colum-
nist George Will, rallying to Bennett's defense, informed his readers that the
Secretary was simply reiterating something Abraham Lincoln had said more
than a century ago.8
The debate over religion's place in American public life tends to focus on
the Supreme Court and its establishment clause9 decisions because, for better or
worse, that is where the action has been for the last forty years. Ever since
Justice Black's famous "wall of separation" opinion in Everson v. Board of Edu-
cation, ° taxpayers and citizens' groups have besieged the Court with com-
plaints about the ways in which religious and governmental institutions interact
with one another. The Court, however, has been notoriously unsuccessful in its
attempts to resolve these cases in a consistent and principled fashion.II
The Supreme Court's unpredictability, like the rancorous debate between
Secretary Bennett and his detractors, reflects a persistent lack of agreement
about the meaning of the establishment clause. Justice Joseph Story, who served
on the Court from 1811 to 1845, noted that when the first amendment was
adopted "the general, if not the universal, sentiment in America was, that Chris-
tianity ought to receive encouragement from the state." 12 No such universal
sentiment exists today. Members of the present Supreme Court have taken a
wide variety of positions, ranging from strict separationism 13 to the jurispruden-
4. Id. at 1.
5. Will, Protectors of the "American Way', Washington Post, Aug. 15, 1985, at A21, col. 6.
6. Zaggari, Founding Intentions, New Republic, Sept. 9, 1985, at 11, col. 2.
7. Id.
8. Will, supra note 5.
9. The first amendment states in part: "Congress shall make no law respecting an establish-
ment of religion, or prohibiting the free exercise thereof .. " U.S. CONST. amend. I.
10. 330 U.S. 1 (1947). Justice Black wrote: "In the words of Jefferson, the clause against
establishment of religion by law was intended to erect 'a wall of separation between church and
State.'" Id. at 16.
11. See generally Wallace v. Jaffree, 105 S. Ct. 2479, 2518-19 (1985) (Rehnquist, J., dissenting)
(list of arguably conflicting decisions). One professor has suggested that the Supreme Court decides
its establishment clause cases according to the "T principle": If state aid to a sectarian institution
comes in the form of something starting with a T-transportation, textbooks, tax exemptions, and
the like-the aid is permissible. Otherwise it is unconstitutional. Interview with Lynn Buzzard,
Professor of Law, Campbell University School of Law (Jan. 13, 1986); see also Schotten, The Estab-
lishment Clause and Excessive Governmental-Religious Entanglement: The Constitutional Status of
Aid to Nonpublic Elementary and Secondary Schools, 15 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 207, 209-10 (1979)
(quoting Judge Antonin Scalia, who claimed that the Court's establishment clause decisions make
"no sense"); Note, Educational Vouchers: Addressing the Establishment Clause Issue, 11 PAc. L.J.
1061, 1077-78 (1980) (Court's establishment clause cases "defy logic").
12. 3 J. STORY, COMMENTARIES ON THE CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED STATES § 1868, at
726 (Boston 1833).
13. See Grand Rapids School Dist. v. Ball, 105 S. Ct. 3216 (1985); Aguilar v. Felton, 105 S. Ct.
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tial antiquarianism of Justice Rehnquist, who believes that nothing in the estab-
lishment clause prohibits government from favoring religion over "irreligion." 14
The future of church-state relations in the United States depends largely on
whose interpretation of the establishment clause prevails in the Supreme Court.
Legal scholars must look beyond the Court and the federal Constitution, how-
ever, if they are to understand the complex interplay between law and religion in
American society. They should recognize, for example, that during most of the
Nation's history, church-state relations were governed almost exclusively by
state law. 15
This Essay traces the history of one of those state laws-the religious test
for public office found in the North Carolina Constitution. 16 Although it is now
a dead letter,17 North Carolina's religious test provides strong evidence of the
intimate connection between religion and American law, both past and present.
At the same time, it illustrates how easily religion can be used as an excuse for
denying basic civil rights to disfavored minorities.
The purpose of this Essay is to examine what the history of North Caro-
lina's religious test can contribute to Secretary Bennett's "conversation and de-
bate on the place of religious belief in our society." 18 The Supreme Court's
"wall of separation" doctrine 19 will be criticized in light of the North Carolina
experience, and the Essay will conclude with a brief look at what may be a better
interpretation of the establishment clause.20
II. NORTH CAROLINA'S RELIGIOUS TEST FOR PUBLIC OFFICE
Some of the religious language in the North Carolina Constitution is quite
familiar. The notion of inalienable rights endowed by the Creator2 l is lifted
directly from the Declaration of Independence. Sections guaranteeing freedom
of conscience 2 and permitting tax exemptions for churches23 are not likely to
3232 (1985). Both of these opinions were written by Justice Brennan and clearly are cast in the
Everson mold.
14. See Wallace v. Jaffree, 105 S. Ct. 2479, 2520 (1985) (Rehnquist, J., dissenting); supra text
accompanying notes 232-36.
15. It was not until the mid-20th century, when the Court began incorporating the Bill of
Rights into the fourteenth amendment, that the establishment clause became relevant to most
church-state questions. See Esbeck, Religion and a Neutral State: Imperative or Impossibility?, 15
CuM. L. REy. 67, 74 n.17 (1984). The Court incorporated the free exercise clause into the four-
teenth amendment's due process clause in Cantwell v. Connecticut, 310 U.S. 296 (1940), and made
the establishment clause applicable to the states in Everson v. Board of Educ., 330 U.S. 1 (1947).
16. See infra text accompanying notes 27-167.
17. See infra notes 32 & 156-67 and accompanying text.
18. Address, supra note 1.
19. See Everson, 330 U.S. at 16.
20. See infra text accompanying notes 238-41.
21. N.C. CONsT. art. I, § 1. "We hold it to be self-evident that all persons. . . are endowed by
their Creator with certain inalienable rights ...." Id.
22. Id. § 13. "All persons have a natural and inalienable right to worship Almighty God ac-
cording to the dictates of their own conscience, and no human authority shall, in any case whatever,
control or interfere with the rights of conscience." Id.
23. Id. art. V, § 2. "The General Assembly may exempt [from taxation] cemeteries and prop-
erty held for. . . religious purposes . I..." d.
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raise many eyebrows.
The average citizen might be a little surprised, however, to learn that the
constitution identifies North Carolina as "a Christian state."'2 4 Religion is said
to be "necessary to good government and the happiness of mankind. 25 The
constitution's opening paragraph is essentially a prayer of praise to "Almighty
God, the Sovereign Ruler of Nations."'2 6
But probably the most startling provision in the state constitution-the one
most likely to offend modern sensibilities-is the section that denies public office
to anyone whose religious opinions are deemed improper. The earliest version of
this religious test, found in the North Carolina Constitution of 1776, permitted
only Protestants to hold office. 2 7 Sixty years later Catholics were given the
right;2 8 then came Jews,29 and finally all other theists.30 Currently, "any person
who shall deny the being of Almighty God" is disqualified from public office by
the North Carolina Constitution. 3 1 This prohibition is almost certainly unen-
forceable, 32 but it remains on the books as a reminder of what Justice Douglas
said more than thirty years ago: Americans are indeed "a religious people."'33
A. Origins of the Religious Test
The origins of North Carolina's religious test for office can be traced to
social and political attitudes that flourished in the region from colonial times
until at least the early twentieth century. Among the most basic of these atti-
tudes was the nearly universal belief that this was a Christian country.34 The
vast majority of North Carolinians during this period were evangelical Protes-
tants, 35 many of whom were not at all shy about integrating their religious and
24. Id. art. XI, § 4. "Beneficent provision for the poor, the unfortunate, and the orphan is one
of the first duties of a civilized and a Christian state." Id.
25. Id. art. IX, § 1. "Religion, morality, and knowledge being necessary to good government
and the happiness of mankind, schools, libraries, and the means of education shall forever be en-
couraged." Id.
26. The preamble to the North Carolina Constitution states:
We, the people of the State of North Carolina, grateful to Almighty God, the Sovereign
Ruler of Nations, for the preservation of the American Union and the existence of our
civil, political and religious liberties, and acknowledging our dependence upon Him for the
continuance of those blessings to us and our posterity, do, for the more certain security
thereof and for the better government of this State, ordain and establish this Constitution.
Id. preamble.
27. N.C. CONST. of 1776, art. XXXII.
28. Id. (amended 1835).
29. Id. (amended 1861).
30. N.C. CONST. of 1868, art. VI, § 5.
31. N.C. CONsT. art. VI, § 8.
32. See Torcaso v. Watkins, 367 U.S. 488, 495-96 (1961); 41 Op. N.C. Att'y Gen. 727 (1972).
33. Zorach v. Clauson, 343 U.S. 306, 313 (1952).
34. See 3 J. STORY, supra note 12, § 1867, at 724.
35. In 1760 an Anglican cleric in North Carolina noted that a
great number of dissenters of all denominations come & settled amongst us from New
Eng[land] Particularly, Anabaptists, Methodist, Quakers and Presbyterians, the anabaptist
are obstinate, illiterate & grossly ignorant, the Methodist, ignorant, censorious & unchari-
table, the Quakers, Rigid, but the Presbyterians are pretty moderate except here & there a
[Vol. 641074
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political points of view. 36
Prior to 1776, Protestant dissenters waged a long battle against the
Anglican establishment in North Carolina. 37 The dissenters eventually won, 38
but their victory did not end government entanglement with religion. In fact,
most North Carolinians, like most of their countrymen, thought that belief in
God and respect for the Bible were essential to the survival of republican self-
government and therefore should be encouraged by the state.39 "This," Justice
Story wrote, "is a point wholly distinct from that of the right of private judg-
ment in matters of religion, and of the freedom of public worship according to
the dictates of one's conscience." 4
Widespread support for religious tests for public office41 was a natural re-
sult of "the ancient common law view that non-conformists and non-believers
. . . were non dignus fide, not worthy of belief." 42 Nobody wanted to confer
public office on someone who could not be trusted. In North Carolina, as in
many other states, Roman Catholics were viewed with particular suspicion.
Protestants often tried to justify anti-Catholic prejudice by charging that the
primary loyalty of Catholics was to a foreign power.43 Some even suggested that
Catholics, if allowed access to public office, might try to establish the Pope as
bigot or rigid Calvinist. As for papists, I cannot learn there are above 9 or 10 in the whole
County. I have estimated the number of Infidels & Heathens to be about 1,000.
VI N.C. COLONIAL Rac. 265 (1888).
36. See, e.g., M. Miller, David Caldwell: The Forming of a Southern Educator 80 (1979) (un-
published dissertation available in the North Carolina Collection, Wilson Library, University of
North Carolina at Chapel Hill). Caldwell, a Presbyterian minister from Guilford County, may have
been the author of the religious test for office in North Carolina's 1776 constitution. See infra note
65 and accompanying text. His most famous sermon, "The Character and Doom of the Sluggard,"
was a veritable call to revolution. See Address by David Caldwell (date unknown), reprinted in E.
CARUTHERS, A SKETCH OF THE LIFE AND CHARACTER OF THE REV. DAVID CALDWELL, D.D.
273-84 (Greensborough 1842).
37. Colonial governors of North Carolina spent considerable time and energy attempting to
secure public financial support for the Anglican church through a series of Vestry Acts. See H.
LEFLER & A. NEWSOME, NORTH CAROLINA: THE HISTORY OF A SOUTHERN STATE 133-34
(1973). In addition, the colonial assembly passed a law giving "virtual control of the performance of
the marriage ceremony to Anglican clergymen." Id. at 136. Laws such as these were the primary
source of opposition to an established church in the new nation.
38. See N.C. CONST. of 1776, art. XXXIV (established church prohibited).
39. See 3 J. STORY, supra note 12, § 1865, at 722-23. Alexis de Tocqueville put it this way:
I do not know if all Americans have faith in their religion-for who can read the secrets of
the heart?-but I am sure that they think it necessary to the maintenance of republican
institutions. That is not the view of one class or party among the citizens, but of the whole
nation; it is found in all ranks.
A. DE TOCQUEVILLE, DEMOCRACY IN AMERICA 293 (G. Lawrence trans. Anchor Books ed. 1969).
40. 3 J. STORY, supra note 12, § 1865, at 723.
41. "[A]t the time of the federal constitutional convention, the constitutions of nine of the
original states imposed religious conditions on some or all public offices." Comment, Validity of
State Requirement That Public Officers Declare Belief in the Existence of God, 36 N.Y.U. L. REV.
513, 514 (1961). The nine states were Delaware, Georgia, Maryland, Massachusetts, New Hamp-
shire, New Jersey, North Carolina, Pennsylvania, and South Carolina. Id. at 514 n.6.
42. Hartogensis, Denial of Equal Rights to Religious Minorities and Non-Believers in the United
States, 39 YALE L.J. 659, 667 (1930). Hartogensis was referring to disqualification of witnesses in
the passage quoted, but the same rationale applies to religious qualifications for public office. See
infra text accompanying notes 68-71.
43. See D. Blower, The Orange County and Mecklenburg County Instructions: The Develop-
ment of Political Individualism in Backcountry North Carolina, 1740-1776, at 85 (1984) (unpub-
1986] 1075
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head of the civil government.44
The first religious tests or qualifications appearing in North Carolina law
were contained in the colony's Fundamental Constitutions, written by John
Locke for the Lords Proprietors in 1669.45 In retrospect the provisions seem
unbelievably harsh, especially in view of Locke's reputation as an advocate of
religious tolerance. No one over the age of seventeen who was not a member of
a church could have "any benefit or protection of the law, or be capable of any
place of profit or honor."' 46 In addition, the Fundamental Constitutions pro-
vided that "[n]o man shall be permitted to be a freeman of Carolina, or to have
any estate or habitation within it, that doth not acknowledge a God; and that
God is publicly and solemnly to be worshipped."' 47 Locke's form of government
was never put into practical effect, 48 however, and it was not until the American
Revolution that North Carolina lawmakers again took up the subject of a reli-
gious test for office.
The men who enacted the state's first constitution were members of North
Carolina's Fifth Provincial Congress, which convened in Halifax on November
12, 1776.49 These representatives had been elected by the freemen of their home
districts and were charged with writing a constitution for the newly independent
state. In some cases delegates carried instructions from their constituents. The
instructions taken to the provincial congress by members from Orange 0 and
Mecklenburg s counties have been preserved and are useful in understanding the
religious test that eventually became article XXXII of the new constitution.5 2
The Orange County instructions, in the handwriting of Thomas Burke, 3
required delegates to "insist upon a free and unrestrained exercise of religion."
54
lished dissertation available in the North Carolina Collection, Wilson Library, University of North
Carolina at Chapel Hill).
44. See 4 J. ELLIOT, THE DEBATES IN THE SEVERAL STATE CONVENTIONS ON THE ADOP-
TION OF THE FEDERAL CONSTITUTION 198 (District of Columbia 1836) (remarks of Governor
Johnston); L. HUHNER, THE STRUGGLE FOR RELIGIOUS LIBERTY IN NORTH CAROLINA, WITH
SPECIAL REFERENCE TO THE JEWS 42 (1907) (available in the North Carolina Collection, Wilson
Library, University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill); ihfra note 76.
45. See 5 F. THORPE, THE FEDERAL AND STATE CONSTITUTIONS, COLONIAL CHARTERS,
AND OTHER ORGANIC LAWS OF THE STATES, TERRITORIES, AND COLONIES Now OR HERETO-
FORE FORMING THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA 2772 (1909).
46. Id. at 2784 (FUNDAMENTAL CONST. OF CAROLINA, art. 101).
47. Id. at 2783 (FUNDAMENTAL CONST. OF CAROLINA, art. 95).
48. H. CONNOR & J. CHESHIRE, THE CONSTITUTION OF THE STATE OF NORTH CAROLINA
ANNOTATED viii (1911).
49. See H. LEFLER & A. NEWSOME, supra note 37, at 221.
50. X N.C. COLONIAL REcS. 870f (1890).
51. Id. at 870a.
52. See infra text accompanying note 66 (full text of article XXXII).
53. Burke, who served as governor of North Carolina during the latter stages of the Revolu-
tionary War, see Haywood, Thomas Burke, in 2 BIOGRAPHICAL HISTORY OF NORTH CAROLINA 27,
29-31 (S. Ashe ed. 1905), began his political career as a radical democrat and ended it as an advocate
of hereditary aristocracy. See Douglass, Thomas Burke, Disillusioned Democrat, 26 N.C. HIST.
REV. 150, 150 (1949). "In religion Burke was an avowed deist, although probably born a Catholic."
Id. at 152. The fact that the Orange County instructions are in Burke's handwriting does not prove
that he authored them, although some of his biographers claim he did. See D. Blower, supra note
43, at 543.
54. X N.C. COLONIAL REC. 870g (1890).
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Delegates were directed, however, to keep out of public office anyone who be-
lieved in "spiritual infallibility," the sacrament of absolution, or the supremacy
of any foreign power. 55
Mecklenburg's instructions were similar, but more explicit.56 The revolu-
tionists of that county also favored free exercise of religion, but only by "profess-
ing Christians."' 57 Section 19 of the Mecklenburg instructions required delegates
to
endeavour that any person who shall hereafter profess himself to be an
Atheist or deny the Being of God or shall deny or blaspheme any of
the persons of the Holy Trinity or shall deny the divine authority of
the Old and New Testament or shall be of the Roman Catholic religion
shall not sustain, hold or enjoy any office of trust or profit in the State
of North Carolina. 58
A committee-prepared draft of a proposed constitution was read to mem-
bers of the provincial congress on December 6, 1776.59 No religious test for
office was included in that initial draft.60 Then, on December 13, Samuel John-
ston,61 an observer at the congress, sent his sister62 a letter complaining that his
return home had been delayed when "one of the members from the back coun-
try"63 suggested inclusion of a religious test in the constitution. "This was car-
ried after a very warm debate," Johnston wrote, "and has blown up such a
flame, that everything is in danger of being thrown into confusion." 64
Hard evidence is lacking, but speculation as to the identity of the "back
country" delegate responsible for the religious test has focused on the Reverend
David Caldwell, an outspokenly anti-Catholic Presbyterian minister and teacher
from Guilford County.65 Nevertheless, the actual language adopted as article
55. Id.
56. The relevant portions of the Mecklenburg County instructions are in the handwriting of
Colonel Waightstill Avery, id. at 870a, "an avowed Presbyterian of Puritan extraction." Pearson,
Waightstill Avery, in 7 BIOGRAPHICAL HISTORY OF NORTH CAROLINA 1, 5 (S. Ashe ed. 1908).
57. X N.C. COLONIAL REc. 870d (1890) (§§ 20-21 of instructions).
58. Id.
59. 1 S. ASHE, HISTORY OF NORTH CAROLINA 565 (1908).
60. Id.
61. Johnston, one of the leading revolutionaries in North Carolina, had been defeated in his bid
for a seat in the provincial congress. He attended anyway and later served as governor of the state.
See Ashe, Samuel Johnston, in 4 BIOGRAPHICAL HISTORY OF NORTH CAROLINA 241, 250-51 (S.
Ashe ed. 1906).
62. Johnston's sister, Hannah, was the wife of James Iredell, see Ashe, James Iredell, in 2
BIOGRAPHICAL HISTORY OF NORTH CAROLINA 198, 199 (S. Ashe ed. 1905), whom George Wash-
ington appointed to the United States Supreme Court in 1790. Id. at 201.
63. Letter from Samuel Johnston to Hannah Johnston Iredell (Dec. 13, 1776), partially re-
printed in 1 S. ASHE, supra note 59, at 566.'
64. Id.
65. See 1 S. ASHE, supra note 59, at 567; E. CARUTHERS, supra note 36, at 190; C. Maddry,
The North Carolina Constitution of 1776, at 39 (1929) (unpublished thesis available in the North
Carolina Collection, Wilson Library, University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill). Caldwell consid-
ered "popery" slavery. Address, supra note 36, at 279. During the North Carolina debates on
ratification of the federal Constitution in 1788, Caldwell stated that the provision prohibiting reli-
gious tests for office, U.S. CONST. art. VI, § 3, "was an invitation for jews and pagans of every kind,
to come among us. . . .All those who have any religion are against the emigration of those people
from the eastern hemisphere." 3 J. ELLIOT, supra note 44, at 176.
1986]
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XXXII of the constitution appears to have been taken largely from the Mecklen-
burg instructions:
XXXII. That no person, who shall deny the being of God or the truth
of the Protestant religion, or the divine authority of the Old or New
Testaments, or who shall hold religious principles incompatible with
the freedom and safety of the State, shall be capable of holding any
office or place of trust or profit in the civil department within the
State.66
Catholics were the principal targets of the religious test. In addition to
being suspicious of Catholic allegiance to the Pope, 67 many Protestants worried
"that the Catholic sacrament of absolution removed the internal sanction of con-
science and thus made Catholics capable of anything."' 68 This fear of unre-
strained licentiousness, however unfounded, provided ammunition to members
of the provincial congress who wished to exclude Catholics from public office.
Jews, atheists, and others were consigned to the political wilderness for similar
reasons: They simply "did not possess internal restraints on behavior recogniza-
ble as such by the dominant Protestant sects."'69
The need for "internal restraints" on officeholders was seldom, if ever, ques-
tioned. Revolutionary leaders throughout the new Nation believed that their
experiment in self-government would fail unless both citizens and their repre-
sentatives exhibited a high degree of civic virtue.70 The source of that virtue was
generally thought to be religion, especially the Protestant religion:
While the founding fathers most thoroughly influenced by rational-
ism-Madison, Jefferson, and a few others-believed that education
could replace religion as a civilizing influence in society, the majority
of Revolutionary leaders wanted religion to play an enlarged role in
the new republic ....
[Article XXXII] of the North Carolina Constitution was a part of
that larger Revolutionary policy toward religion. The clause did not
intend so much to exclude anyone from office, as to stress that govern-
mental power should be handled by those who acknowledged that
there was a moral basis to politics. Belief in the Bible and the theology
of the Reformation. . .were simply means of defining the moral basis
of political life. 7 1
The provincial congress that enacted article XXXII also approved constitu-
tional provisions forbidding "establishment of any one religious church or de-
66. N.C. CONST. of 1776, art. XXXII.
67. See supra text accompanying notes 43-44.
68. D. Blower, supra note 43, at 85.
69. Id.
70. See R. CALHOON, RELIGION AND THE AMERICAN REVOLUTION IN NORTH CAROLINA 69
(1976) (available in the North Carolina Collection, Wilson Library, University of North Carolina at
Chapel Hill); see also D. Blower, supra note 43, at 86 (N.C. leaders were unwilling to carry religious
liberty too far; commonly shared internal values were demanded).
71. R. CALHOON, supra note 70, at 69-70. Calhoon is correct in asserting that article XXXII
was intended to preserve the "moral basis of political life," but there can be little doubt that many
who supported the religious test fully intended to exclude Catholics, Jews, and others from office.
See L. HUHNER, supra note 44, at 41.
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nomination" 72 and guaranteeing to all persons "liberty to exercise their own
mode of worship."' 73 In addition, the constitution prohibited clergymen from
holding office in the Senate, House of Commons, or Council of State.74 These
provisions, viewed in concert with the religious test, indicate that the framers of
North Carolina's first constitution were inclined toward a rather narrow view of
separation of church and state. Both the "establishment clause" and the polit-
ical disabilities placed on the clergy indicate a strong commitment to institu-
tional separation- a barrier that would prevent the state from identifying itself
too closely with any of the various denominations. But church and state were
narrowly defined. The goal was to prevent religious conflict similar to that
caused by establishment of the Anglican church during the colonial period, not
to insulate government from religion in general. Very few revolutionary leaders
advocated separation of religious opinions from political decision making or
from the public life of the community.75 In other words, separation of church
and state did not necessarily mean separation of religion and government. 76
72. N.C. CONST. of 1776, art. XXXIV.
73. Id.
74. Id. art. XXXI.
75. See supra text accompanying notes 70-71.
Though not a North Carolinian, George Washington in many respects epitomized the revolu-
tionary spirit of North Carolinians and their countrymen. In his farewell address, Washington said:
"[L]et us with caution indulge the supposition, that morality can be maintained without religion.
Whatever may be conceded to the influence of refined education on minds of peculiar structure,
reason and experience both forbid us to expect that National morality can prevail in exclusion of
religious principle." Address by President Washington (Sept. 17, 1796), reprinted in Bellah, Civil
Religion in America, in RELIGION IN AMERICA 3, 8 (W. McLoughlin & R. Bellah eds. 1968).
76. North Carolina politicians debated the usefulness of religious tests at least once more dur-
ing the 18th century when they met to consider ratification of the proposed federal Constitution.
The prohibition of religious tests for federal offices, U.S. CONsT. art. VI, § 3, was discussed on July
30, 1788, at the state convention in Hillsborough. 4 J. ELLIOT, supra note 44, at 191-98. Earlier,
pamphlets had been circulated at the convention "pointing out in all seriousness the possible danger
of the Pope being elected President, should the Constitution be adopted." L. HUHNER, supra note
44, at 42.
Henry Abbot, a Baptist, id. at 43, opened the discussion by noting that "[tihe exclusion of
religious tests is by many thought dangerous and impolitic. They suppose that if there be no reli-
gious test required, pagans, deists, and Mahometans might obtain offices among us, and that the
senators and representatives might all be pagans." 4 J. ELLIOT, supra note 44, at 192.
James Iredell responded with a long speech to the convention. He pointed out that religious
tests could prevent only conscientious persons from taking office; unscrupulous candidates would
simply lie about their qualifications. See id. at 192-96. Iredell argued that a religious test for office
would be contrary to the principle of religious freedom, and he observed that "it is never to be
supposed that the people of America will trust their dearest rights to persons who have no religion at
all, or a religion materially different from their own." Id. at 194. As for suggestions that the Pope
might be elected President, Iredell found it "impossible to treat such idle fears with any degree of
gravity." Id. at 196.
Samuel Johnston, then governor of North Carolina, echoed Iredell's opinions, but David Cald-
well, who may have been responsible for the religious test in the state's constitution, see supra note
65 and accompanying text, expressed concern about a flood of Jewish and pagan immigrants. 4 J.
ELLIOT, supra note 44, at 189. Johnston replied that "in all probability, the children even of such
people would be Christians; and that this, with the rapid population of the United States, their zeal
for religion, and love of liberty, would, he trusted, add to the progress of the Christian religion
among us." Id. at 200.
The state convention failed to ratify the Constitution during the summer of 1788, and North
Carolina did not approve it until November 21, 1789, "exactly seventeen months after ratification by
the nine states necessary for the adoption of the new government." W. TORPEY, JUDICIAL Doc-
TRINES OF RELIGIOUS RIGHTS IN AMERICA 21 (1948).
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B. The Fight Against the Religious Test
There is no way of knowing how many people, if any, the religious test
discouraged from seeking public office in North Carolina. If anyone was offi-
cially denied a position in the government because he was not religiously quali-
fied, the incident has been forgotten.7 7 In fact, history records only two
instances in which political figures found their careers threatened by the reli-
gious test.78
Little is known about Jacob Henry, except that he was a Jew elected to the
state House of Commons from Carteret County in 1808 and 1809.79 During
Henry's second term a fellow member of the House tried to get him removed
from office on account of his faith.80 Henry responded with a brilliant speech in
defense of religious liberty. 8 1 North Carolinians have a natural and inalienable
right to freedom of conscience, he argued, and neither drafters of constitutions
nor legislators have the power to abridge that right.82 Henry asked his col-
leagues whether they were prepared to "plunge at once from the sublime heights
of moral legislation into the gloomy caverns of superstitious ignorance,"' 83 and
thereby "drive from your shores and from the shelter of your constitution, all
who do not lay their oblations on the same altar."'84 He concluded:
Nothing is more easily demonstrated than that the conduct alone
is the subject of human laws, and that man ought to suffer civil dis-
qualification for what he does and not for what he thinks. . . . What
may be the religion of him who made this objection against me, or
whether he has any religion or not I am unable to say. I have never
considered it my duty to pry into the belief of other members of this
house. If their actions are upright and conduct just, the rest is for their
own consideration, not for mine. 85
Henry ultimately retained his seat when the House came up with a rather
far-fetched interpretation of article XXXII. By its terms, the religious test ex-
77. See 2 W. BOYD, HISTORY OF NORTH CAROLINA: THE FEDERAL PERIOD 1783.1860, at
146 (1919). The opponents of minister-legislators were apparently more vigilant. At least three
persons were expelled from the state legislature because they were clergymen. Id. at 145.
78. See infra text accompanying notes 79-109.
79. See 2 S. ASHE, HISTORY OF NORTH CAROLINA 207 (1925). Henry may have come to
North Carolina from Philadelphia, see L. HUHNER, supra note 44, at 46-47, and probably was a
Federalist. See Schauinger, William Gaston: Southern Statesman, 18 N.C. HIsT. REV. 99, 106
(1941).
80. See L. HUHNER, supra note 44, at 46.
81. The speech was considered "so superior that for several generations parts of it were embod-
ied in books of elocution used in the academies of the country." 2 S. ASHE, supra note 79, at 207.
The author of the address may have been John L. Taylor, see Schauinger, supra note 79, at 106 n.8, a
Catholic who, despite his religion, served as a member of the legislature and as Chief Justice of the
North Carolina Supreme Court. L. HUHNER, supra note 44, at 48 & n.5.
82. Address by Jacob Henry (1809), reprinted in L. HUHNER, supra note 44, at 68-69. The
Fifth Provincial Congress included freedom of conscience in the declaration of rights it promulgated
along with North Carolina's first state constitution. See N.C. DECLARATION OF RIGHTS of 1776,
art. XIX. The legal substance of Henry's argument was that this guarantee overruled any contrary
provision in the constitution.
83. Address, supra note 82, at 70.
84. Id.
85. Id. at 70-71.
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cluded Jews, Catholics, and other supposed undesirables from offices "in any
civil department within this State. ' 86 The House decided that this did not in-
clude the legislature, which was superior to the "civil department. 8 7 Thus,
after 1809 "Catholics and Jews could make the laws but could neither execute
nor interpret them."'88
One of Henry's allies in the fight against religious persecution was William
Gaston,89 a Catholic who was to figure prominently in the history of article
XXXII.90 Born in New Bern on September 19, 1778, Gaston saw his patriot
father killed there by Tories during the Revolutionary War.9 1 After graduating
with honors from Princeton in 1796,92 he embarked on a legal and political
career that included several terms in the state legislature and four years in Con-
gress.93 As a member of the state House of Commons, he supported Henry's bid
to retain his seat; no doubt he was gratified by the removal of a potential threat
to his own legislative career. The Henry affair, however, was merely the opening
skirmish in Gaston's battle against the religious test.
In 1832 Gaston's son was offered an appointment as justice of the peace, 94
an office clearly within the "civil department." Gaston, by then a prosperous
lawyer in his mid-fifties, wrote to his friend, Justice Thomas Ruffin of the North
Carolina Supreme Court, asking if article XXXII precluded a Catholic from
accepting such an appointment.9 5 Ruffin replied that it did not:
Probably the intelligent men who drew up the law in order to
satisfy bigots, purposely and patriotically framed the clause in such
terms as to have no precise ideas affixed to them and it cannot there-
fore be judicially interpreted in a manner to impose the disability
. . . .Terms ought to be perfectly clear when the country imposes
upon herself limitations. There is not the least ambiguity in other
parts of the Constitution. Finally, who shall say what is the Protestant
religion.96
Ruffin's analysis may have been somewhat disingenuous, but it contributed
to the gradual erosion of article XXXII. In August 1833, North Carolina's chief
justice, Leonard Henderson, died at his home in Granville County.97 Gaston's
86. N.C. CONST. of 1776, art. XXXII.
87. L. HUHNER, supra note 44, at 52.
88. Id.
89. Schauinger, supra note 79, at 106.
90. Unlike Jacob Henry, Gaston is well-remembered. Gaston County, west of Charlotte, is
named for him.
91. See Battle, William Gaston, in 2 BIOGRAPHICAL HISTORY OF NORTH CAROLINA 99 (S.
Ashe ed. 1905).
92. Id. at 100.
93. Id. at 101.
94. See Schauinger, supra note 79, at 123.
95. See Schauinger, William Gaston and the Supreme Court of North Carolina, 21 N.C. HIST.
REv. 97, 102 (1944).
96. Letter from Thomas Ruffin to William Gaston (May 23, 1832),partially reprinted in Schau-
inger, supra note 95, at 102-03.
97. See Battle, Memoir of Leonard Henderson, 9 N.C.U. MAG. 193, 199 (1859) (available in the
North Carolina Collection, Wilson Library, University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill).
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name headed the list of potential replacements. At least twice before he had
refused to serve on the supreme court, but this time the pressure was intense. 98
Governor Swain sent a letter urging Gaston to accept the nomination.9 9 Less
than a week later Ruffin also wrote, threatening to resign if Gaston did not join
him on the court.l10 Ruffin's resignation would have threatened the very exist-
ence of the supreme court1° 1-then a relatively weak institution with many ene-
mies in the legislature' 02-but still Gaston hesitated. Among other things, he
was worried about the religious test for office. 10 3 Henry Seawell, a superior
court judge who coveted a seat on the supreme court, mounted a letter-writing
campaign and appeared "to be in great trepidation less [sic] the protestant reli-
gion should be endangered"' ' 04 by Gaston's nomination. Although Gaston by
this time had convinced himself that Ruffin's interpretation of article XXXII
was correct, he wanted to be sure there was adequate support for this
position. ' 05
Expressions of support came quickly, including one from John Marshall,
then Chief Justice of the United States.10 6 In September 1833, Gaston permitted
his name to be placed in nomination. 10 7 Two months later he was elected to the
court by the legislature, receiving 112 votes to Seawell's 42.108 Ruffin and Gas-
ton drew lots to see who would be chiefjustice, and in one of the few setbacks of
his remarkable career, Gaston lost.10 9
As a member of the supreme court, Gaston labored to ameliorate the effects
of slavery, which he called "the worst evil that afflicted the South." "0 His bat-
tle against the religious test also continued, but not in the court. The next con-
frontation was during the state constitutional convention of 1835.
Delegates from across North Carolina gathered in June of that year to mod-
ernize the form of government established in 1776. The state capitol had burned
down four years earlier, and the convention initially met in the governor's man-
sion, at the foot of Fayetteville Street in Raleigh. The house was too hot, how-
ever, and on June 6 the delegates moved to the First Presbyterian Church, at the
98. See Schauinger, supra note 79, at 123.
99. See Schauinger, supra note 95, at 101-02.
100. Id. at 102.
101. See id.
102. See id. at 97-98.
103. See Schauinger, supra note 79, at 123. An even bigger concern was money. Gaston was
$8000 in debt and faced the prospect of slashing his annual income from about $6000 to $2500 if he
joined the court. This obstacle was overcome by means of a long-term loan. Id. at 124.
104. Letter from George E. Badger to William Gaston (Nov. 14, 1833) (available in the William
Gaston Papers, Southern Historical Collection, Wilson Library, University of North Carolina at
Chapel Hill).
105. See Schauinger, supra note 79, at 123-24.
106. See id. at 124.
107. See Letter from William Gaston to T.P. Devereux (Sept. 9, 1833) (available in the William
Gaston Papers, Southern Historical Collection, Wilson Library, University of North Carolina at
Chapel Hill).





comer of Salisbury and Morgan Streets.11 1 Amidst these ecclesiastical sur-
roundings, the convention, on June 26, began to discuss the future of the reli-
gious test for public office. 112
The debate immediately became the most popular public entertainment in
town. Day after day, spectators thronged the gallery and watched tbrough the
windows and doors of the church.1 13 The speeches were sometimes brilliant and
often long. "Little was left unsaid as delegate after delegate rose to say that he
would not long detain the convention, then rambled on for hours. Other dele-
gates came from their sickbeds to address the convention but scarcely added
anything which had not been said before." 114
Delegates from the eastern part of the state generally favored abolishing the
religious test, whereas those from the west overwhelmingly opposed its elimina-
tion. 115 Party politics also played a role. Democrats tended to oppose any
amendment of article XXXII, whereas the Whigs, including Gaston, argued for
at least some loosening of the restrictions on non-Protestants. 116
The opponents of reform were led by James Smith of Orange County.
Smith noted that there had been no public outcry for an amendment to the
religious test.1 17 The presence of Catholics in the government, he said, demon-
strated that article XXXII had worked no harm, although "the time might come
when it would be needed." 1 1 8 Referring to "the excitements and disorders of the
French Revolution,"' 1 9 Smith urged the convention to retain the religious test
"as Sleeping Thunder, to be called up only when necessary to defeat some deep
laid scheme of ambition."' 120 - He added that
he was not willing, by expunging this Article, to let in Turks, Hindoos
and Jews. They might call him a bigot as much as they pleased, but he
would not consent to this. . . . As an American citizen, and a native
son of North-Carolina, he was willing that every sect should indulge in
their own peculiar species of worship; but he was not willing that they
should ifil the high places of the land. 12 1
Jesse Cooper, a delegate from Martin County, also referred to the lack of popu-
lar support for an amendment, 122 and added a warning about Catholicism: "He
had been told by a person who heard a Catholic say, that it made no difference
Ill. Counihan, The North Carolina Constitutional Convention of 1835: A Study in Jacksonian
Democracy, 46 N.C. HIST. REv. 335, 339 (1969).
112. See PROCEEDINGS AND DEBATES OF THE CONVENTION OF NORTH-CAROLINA 213 (Ra-
leigh 1836) [hereinafter cited as PROCEEDINGS].
113. See The Star and North Carolina Gazette, July 2, 1835, at 3, col. 2 (available in the North
Carolina Collection, Wilson Library, University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill).
114. Counihan, supra note 111, at 351.
115. See Worsley, Catholicism in Antebellum North Carolina, 60 N.C. HIST. REV. 399, 423
(1983).
116. See Counihan, supra note 111, at 353.
117. See PROCEEDINGS, supra note 112, at 243.
118. Id. at 244.
119. Id.
120. Id.
121. Id. at 308.
122. See id. at 242.
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to him whether he swore on the New Testament or a Spelling Bookl He did not
think that such men ought to be trusted." 123
Several speakers supported removing the restrictions placed on Catholics
but continuing the disqualification of non-Christians. 124 Josiah Crudup, who
fifteen years earlier had been kicked out of the legislature for being a clergy-
man,125 noted that "[a]ll the institutions of this country. . acknowledged the
truth of the Christian Religion."' 26 Jesse Speight, from Greene County, sug-
gested that article XXXII be amended by substituting the word "Christian" for
"Protestant."'
2 7
The longest speeches were given by delegates who wished to abolish the
religious test altogether.' 28 Some delivered extended defenses of Catholic doc-
trine and practice.129 Warren County's Nathaniel Macon said he did not believe
in the existence of atheists130 and thought a Catholic takeover of the government
was "half as probable" as a mouse killing a buffalo.' 31 Kenneth Rayner, one of
the youngest members of the convention, 132 gave an eloquent reply to James
Smith's argument for retaining the religious test:
The gentleman from Orange, gave as a reason for retaining this
Article, that some Revolution might hereafter arise, as in France, and
that this sleeping thunder would then be ready to be hurled at any
Danton or Robespierre who might aspire to direct the storm. Sir,
when we are ready to receive a Robespierre for a master, all the moth-
eaten parchments in our archives... will not be able to shield us from
slavery. 133
The longest and most distinguished speech of all was given by William Gas-
ton. Beginning on the morning of June 30, he spoke for several hours 34 about
Catholicism 135 and the history of religious persecution. 136 Gaston recalled the
Jacob Henry incident 137 and explained why article XXXII, even in its original
form, did not apply to Catholics. Echoing Ruffin's letter of the preceding year,
he asked who was to say what constitutes the Protestant religion. 138 Catholics
affirm all the major Protestant creeds, he argued, so how can it be said that
123. Id. at 243.
124. See id. at 242 (Wellborn), 245-46 (Crudup), 248-49 (Speight).
125. See 2 W. BOYD, supra note 77, at 145.
126. PROCEEDINGS, supra note 112, at 245.
127. Id. at 249.
128. See id. at 214-19 (Edwards), 219-40 (Bryan), 254-64 (Rayner), 264-305 (Gaston).
129. See id. at 223-29 (Bryan), 293-302 (Gaston).
130. See id. at 247. "It was impossible for any man to look at himself, at the water, at the animal
and vegetable kingdom, at the sun, moon or stars, without acknowledging the existence of a GREAT
FIRST CAUSE." Id.
131. Id. at 248.
132. Id. at 255. He was about 27 years old.
133. Id. at 261.
134. The report of his speech covers 41 pages of small print in the convention journal. Id. at
264-305.
135. See id. at 293-302.
136. See id. at 288-92.
137. See id. at 281.
138. See id. at 267.
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Catholics deny the truth of the Protestant religion?139 Then, having covered his
flank, Gaston recommended abandonment of the religious test:
Shall we afford to the bigots, the fanatics, and the friends of arbitrary
power abroad, an apology for claiming this State as an ally in the cause
of Intolerance? I hope not. I trust that we shall act up to the axiom
proclaimed in our Bill of Rights, and permit no man to suffer incon-
venience or to incur incapacity, because of religion, whether he be Jew
or Gentile, Christian or Infidel, Heretic or Orthodox. Pollute not the
ark of God with unholy touch. Divine Truth needs not the support of
human power, either to convince the understanding or to regulate the
heart. Dare not to define divine truth, for it belongs not to your func-
tions, and you may set up falsehood and error in its stead. Prohibit,
restrain and punish, as offenses against human society, all practices
insulting to the faith, the institutions, and the worship of your people,
but offer no bribes to lure men to profess a faith which they do not
believe, inflict no penalties to deter them from embracing what their
understandings approve, and make no distinction of ranks and orders
in the community because of religious opinions. 14°
Reporters present at the convention heaped praise on Gaston's speech. "I
looked around in vain for [opponents of reform]," one wrote, "and began to fear
that the Pope, in the shape of the Old Boy himself, had spirited them away for
abusing the Catholics .. .never was defeat more effectual."' 14 1 Chancellor
James Kent of New York, who read the speech later, "highly approved of its
logic and admired its whole texture, taste, candor, aid eloquence."' 142 But in
the end, Gaston's eloquence was not enough. After rejecting several attempts to
abolish or substantially alter the religious test,143 the convention approved a
compromise amendment and substituted the word "Christian" for "Protestant"
in article XXXII.144 Gaston voted for the compromise, 14 5 even though it left
Jews and other non-Christians out in the cold. It was the best he could get.
Gaston served on the supreme court another eight and one-half years. On
January 23, 1844, while listening to oral arguments, he fainted and was taken to
his room in Raligh. He later revived and entertained friends who came to see
about his condition. At some point during the evening he told the story of a
party he had attended in Washington while a member of Congress. One of the
guests, a politician, had bragged about being t "free-thinker" in matters pertain-
ing to religion. Gaston said he had been disgusted by the man's statement.
"A belief in an all-ruling Divinity, who shapes our ends, whose eye is upon
139. See id. at 268.
140. Id. at 292.
141. Schauinger, supra note 79, at 128 (quoting article in New Bern Spectator, July 10, 1835);
see also Raleigh Register and North Carolina Gazette, July 7, 1835, at 3, col. 3 ("Judge Gaston's
speech, which occupied the best part of two days in the delivery, was decidedly the greatest effort,
which it has ever been our good fortune to hear.").
142. Letter from James Kent to William Gaston (Nov. 26, 1835), partially reprinted in Schau-
inger, supra note 79, at 129.
143. See PROCEEDINGS, supra note 112, at 309-12.
144. Id. at 331-32.
145. Id. at 331.
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us, and who will reward us according to our deeds, is necessary," the elderly
judge told his friends. "We must believe and feel that there is a God All-Wise
and Almighty. 14 6
The great opponent of religious persecution then rose from his chair, appar-
ently to emphasize his statement affirming the necessity of faith. A moment
later he fell dead. 147
C. The Religious Test After 1835
The post-1835 history of North Carolina's religious test for office is some-
what paradoxical. On the one hand, the religious test quickly became a genu-
inely dead letter. Public discussion of the test seems virtually to have ceased. It
is as if the great debate of 1835 exhausted the issue, and people were then con-
tent to forget about it.
On the other hand, the religious test has stubbornly maintained its formal
existence. In 1858 a Jewish congregation in Wilmington presented a petition to
the legislature asking for removal of the disability placed on Jews. 14 8 A bill to
amend the constitution was filed in the House of Representatives, only to die in
the judiciary committee. 149 The committee report stated that the religious test
was "a relic of bigotry and intolerance unfit to be associated in our fundamental
law with the enlightened principles of representative government,' 5 0 but con-
cluded that it was not then expedient to alter the constitution.
Three years later Jews finally got relief, even as the state was taking drastic
action to protect yet another relic of bigotry and intolerance. At the secession
convention of 1861, Judge Ruffin, Gaston's old ally, moved to amend the consti-
tution so that it would bar from office only atheists and those who denied "the
divine authority of both the Old and New Testaments." 15 1 The motion
passed,152 and Judaism ceased to be a political liability, at least as far as the
religious test was concerned. An effort to eliminate the religious test altogether
was soundly defeated. 153
Following the Civil War, Reconstruction authorities directed North Caro-
lina to frame a new constitution. 154 The convention of 1868 adopted a religious
test disqualifying from office "all persons who shall deny the being of Almighty
God." ' 55 Once again, those favoring complete elimination of religious qualifica-
tions were in the minority.
146. Battle, supra note 91, at 106.
147. Id. at 106-07.
148. See L. HUHNER, supra note 44, at 64.
149. See id. at 64-65.
150. Id. at 65.
151. JOURNAL OF THE CONVENTION 90 (Raleigh 1862) (emphasis added); ORDINANCES AND
RESOLUTIONS PASSED By THE STATE CONVENTION 56 (Raleigh 1862) (emphasis added) [hereinaf-
ter cited as ORDINANCES AND RESOLUTIONS].
152. ORDINANCES AND RESOLUTIONS, supra note 151, at 56.
153. JOURNAL OF THE CONVENTION, supra note 151, at 92.
154. See 5 F. THORPE, supra note 45, at 2800 note b.
155. N.C. CONST. of 1868, art. VI, § 5.
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Nearly a century later, in 1961, the United States Supreme Court decided
the case of Torcaso v. Watkins.1 56 Torcaso had been appointed a notary public
by the governor of Maryland 157 but was denied his commission when he refused
to take an oath stating his belief in God.' 58 The oath requirement was based on
a provision of the Maryland constitution which stated that "no religious test
ought ever be required as a qualification for any office. . . other than a declara-
tion of belief in the existence of God." 159 Torcaso filed a petition for a writ of
mandamus but lost in the Maryland courts. 160 He appealed to the Supreme
Court, claiming a violation of rights protected by the first and fourteenth amend-
ments.16 1 The Court, in an opinion by Justice Black, ruled in Torcaso's favor:
We repeat and again reaffirm that neither a State nor the Federal
Government can constitutionally force a person "to profess a belief or
disbelief in any religion." Neither can constitutionally pass laws or
impose requirements which aid all religions as against non-believers,
and neither can aid those religions based on a belief in the existence of
God as against those religions founded on different beliefs ....
The fact. . . that a person is not compelled to hold public office
cannot possibly be an excuse for barring him from office by state-
imposed criteria forbidden by the Constitution ....
This Maryland religious test for public office unconstitutionally
invades the appellant's freedom of belief and religion and therefore
cannot be enforced against him. 162
There can be little doubt that Torcaso invalidated North Carolina's reli-
gious test as well as Maryland's.' 63 Nevertheless, when the North Carolina
General Assembly presented a new constitution to the electorate in 1970,164 the
religious test remained intact. No doubt some legislators thought the Torcaso
decision was wrong or somehow inapplicable. Most probably wished to avoid
controversy that might jeopardize approval of more important provisions and
therefore chose the path of least resistance. 165 In any event the voters went
156. 367 U.S. 488 (1961).
157. Id. at 489.
158. Constitutional Law-Oath Which Includes Declaration That Taker Believes in God Held To
Be a Valid Prerequisite for State Office, 109 U. PA. L. REv. 611, 611 (1961) (reviewing Maryland
Court of Appeals decision later reversed by Supreme Court) [hereinafter cited as Oath].
159. Torcaso, 367 U.S. at 489.
160. See Oath, supra note 158, at 611.
161. See id.
162. Torcaso, 367 U.S. at 495-96.
163. See 41 Op. N.C. Att'y Gen. 727 (1972).
164. See Sanders, A Brief History of the Constitutions of North Carolina, in THE CONSTITUTION
OF THE STATE OF NORTH CAROLINA: ITS HISTORY AND CONTENT 8 (1983).
165. Interview with John L. Sanders, Director of the Institute of Government, University of
North Carolina at Chapel Hill (Oct. 22, 1985); Interview with Joseph S. Ferrell, Professor of Public
Law and Government, Institute of Government, University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill (Nov.
18, 1985). Professor Ferrell stated that elimination of the religious test would have raised "red
flags," thereby making the revision vulnerable to charges that the legislature was trying to "remove
God from the constitution." The provision was a dead letter anyway, so it was easier to ignore it.
Id.
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along with the legislature, 166 and to this day the state constitution, however
ineffectually, bars nonbelievers from public office. 167
III. THE ROLE OF RELIGION IN AMERICAN PUBLIC LIFE
A. Inevitable Entanglement
North Carolina's religious test for public office in many respects symbolizes
the dark side of American democracy. The drafters of article XXXII suc-
cumbed to a form of crude majoritarianism that was singularly inappropriate to
the creation of a free society. Later attempts to justify the religious test were
generally founded on ignorance and prejudice. Supporters of the test seemed to
have forgotten that demociatic constitutions protect minorities by granting
equal rights to all. Similarly, the putative defenders- of religion ignored the fact
that today's majority may be tomorrow's minority, liable to have done unto
them as they have done unto others.
Ultimately the religious test proved to be such an embarrassment that no
one had the heart to enforce it. New frontiers of legal sophistry were explored in
the search for reasons why the test did not apply to Jacob Henry or William
Gaston. It was sophistry in the service of liberty, however, and few complained.
Those charged with enforcing the constitution seemed to realize that Kenneth
Rayner had been right about religious tests: When a people is willing to accept
untrustworthy or despotic leaders, "all the moth-eaten parchments in our
archives . . . will not be able to shield us from slavery. ' 168
North Carolina's religious test for public office represents an attempt to use
religion as a club against dissenters and minorities. As a weapon, it belongs in
the dustbin of history. Reformers must take care, however, io avoid overreact-
ing. Many people have responded to histories such as this one by asserting the
need for separation of religion and government, religion and politics, and reli-
gion and law. Religion, many of these separationists believe, is politically dys-
functional and should be kept out of the social and legal process that Americans
call government. 169
Though well-intentioned, the separationist response goes too far. If nothing
else, it fails to consider what the history of North Carolina's religious test
teaches about the human condition and the role of religion in a democratic soci-
ety. In short, it ignores the fact that religion, properly'understood, is histori-
166. The electorate approved the new constitution by a vote of 393,759 to 251,132. Sanders,
supra note 164, at 8.
167. See N.C. CONsT. art. VI, § 8.
168. PROCEEDINGS, supra note 112,, at .261; see supra text accompanying note 133. Judge
Learned Hand once expressed a similar sentiment:
I often wonder whether we do not rest our hopes too much upon constitutions, upon
laws and upon courts. These are false hopes; believe me, these are false hopes. Liberty lies
in the hearts of men and women; when it dies there, no constitution, no law, no court can
save it; no constitution, no law, no court can even do much to help it.
L. HAND, THE SPIRIT OF LIBERTY 189-90 (1960).
169. See Esbeck, supra note 15, at 75-76.
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cally, intrinsically, and unavoidably entangled both in our fundamental law and
in the lawmaking process.
Richard John Neuhaus, a Lutheran theologian and social critic, has de-
scribed the relationship between religion and politics as follows:
[P]olitics is in large part a function of culture. . . . [A]t the heart of
culture is religion. In this connection "religion" is meant comprehen-
sively. It includes not just those ideas and activities and attitudes that
we ordinarily call religious, but all the ways we think and act and in-
teract with respect to what we believe is ultimately true and important.
There is nothing frightfully original in this way of connecting politics,
culture, and religion. A host of thinkers, including Tillich, Hegel, and
Plato, have made the connection in a similar way. With astonishing
frequency, however, the connection is neglected in writing about reli-
gion and politics today.170
Strict separationism is closely tied to a definition of religion that largely
ignores the connections mentioned by Neuhaus. Conditioned by several centu-
ries of pietistic Christianity, Americans and other Westerners tend to identify
religion with churches, dogma; sacred'ritual, and other incidents of traditional
theism. 17 1 Understood in these terms, religion can be neatly separated-in the-
ory, at least-from purportedly secular activities and institutions such as politics
and government.,
Churchgoers and theists, however, do not have a monopoly on religious
expression. Deeply personal and often unprovable assumptions about the nature
of reality and the meaning of life guide the thoughts and actions of every individ-
ual, not just those who believe in God or attend a recognized church.172 Collec-
170. R. NEUHAUS, THE NAKED PUBLIC SQUARE 27-28 (1984).
Law is not only a body of rules; it is'people legislating, adjudicating, administering, negoti-
ating-it is a living process of allocating rights and duties and thereby resolving conflicts
and creating channels ofcooperation. Religion is not only a set of doctrines and exercises;
it is pe9ple manifesting eolletive concern for the ultimate meaning and purpose of life-
it is a shared in'tuition ofand cbmitment to transcendent values. Law helps to give soci-
ety the structure, be geitalt', it needs lo Aaintaiffinner cohesion; law fights against anar-
chy. Religion helps to give society-the faith it needslto face the future; religion fights
against deeacde.nce.
H. BERMAN, THE INTERACTION OF LAW AND RELIGION 24 (1974) (emphasis omitted).
171. Cf. L. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 826 (1978) ("At least through the nine-
teenth century. . 'religion referred to theistic notions respecting divinity, morality, and worship,
and was recognized as legitimate and protecfed only insofar Eli it'was generally accepted as 'civilized'
by Western standards.").
172. The late Paul Tillich, one of this century's foremost Protestant theologians, argued that
traditional definitions of God and religion are inadequate:
The name of this infinite and inexhaustible depth and ground of all being is God. That
depth is what the -word God means. And if thit word has not much meaning for you,
translate it, and speak of the depths of your life, of the source of your being, of your
ultimate concern ....
P. TILLICH, THE SHAKING OF THE FOUNDATIONS 63 (1962)
Tillich's definition of Go d may be suspect from the point of view of orthodox Christianity, but
his approach to religion as the~expression of one's ultimate concern is slowly'finding its way into
constitutional jurisprudence. Professor Tribe mentins with 4pproval the Supreme Court's gradual
acceptance of a broad, uabty' Tllichian definition of religion in its free exercise cases. L. TRIBE,
supra note 171, at 827-33., He notes,' hwever that "ja the age of the affirmative and increasingly
pervasive state, a les$ expaisive notion of religion was required for establishment clause purposes lest
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tive beliefs about what is ultimately true and important are part and parcel of
the lawmaking process; self-government is largely a matter of faith. 173 Religion,
in this sense, cannot be put in a box and placed on a shelf marked "personal."
Neither the courts nor a constitution can separate religion from public life.174
The history of North Carolina's religious test for office illustrates how "the
dialectical unity of law and religion" 175 functions in a democracy. At every
stage the religious test has mirrored the predominate belief system of the sur-
rounding political community. Initially reflective of an overwhelmingly Protes-
tant majority,176 the test later evolved into an affirmation of more generalized
Christianity. 177 Still later it came to reflect the theistic, quasi-Christian form of
civil religion that North Carolinians, along with other Americans, adopted as a
public faith during the nineteenth century. 178 The resiliency of that civil reli-
gion is evident in the fact that the state legislature, despite having an opportu-
nity to remove the religious test from the constitution as recently as 1970, did
all 'humane' programs of government be deemed constitutionally suspect." Id. at 827-28. Professor
Tribe worries, for example, that under a broad definition of religion, the establishment clause might
prohibit public schools from teaching meditation or even psychology as electives. Id. at 828. One
might ask, however, whether a broad definition of religion would present such problems if the Court
were not entangled in its separationist interpretation of the establishment clause. See infra text
accompanying notes 214-41.
173. Cf. H. BERMAN, LAW AND REVOLUTION at vii (1983) ("[L]aw has to be believed in or it
will not work; it involves not only reason and will but also emotion, intuition, and faith.").
174. Cf. R. MCCARTHY, D. OPPEWAL, W. PETERSON & G. SPYKMAN, SOCIETY, STATE, &
SCHOOLS 96-97 (1981) (religion is intrinsic to the identities of public institutions as well as private
individuals) [hereinafter cited as SOCIETY, STATE, & SCHOOLS].
175. H. BERMAN, supra note 170, at 137.
176. See supra text accompanying notes 34-76.
177. See supra text accompanying notes 111-45.
178. See supra text accompanying notes 148-55. An easily accessible work on the American civil
religion is Bellah, supra note 75.
Bellah traces the idea of civil religion (the phrase itself is Rousseau's) to the Founding
Fathers. He writes that "from the earliest years of the republic" we have had "a collection
of beliefs, symbols, and rituals with respect to sacred things and institutionalized in a col-
lectivity. This religion-there seems no other word for it-while not antithetical to and
indeed sharing much in common with Christianity, was neither sectarian nor in any spe-
cific sense Christian"-though at first the society itself "was overwhelmingly Christian."
H. BERMAN, supra note 170, at 154 n.24 (quoting Bellah, supra note 75, at 10).
The content this civil religion had acquired by the mid-19th century-and the degree to which
it had captured the American imagination-is perhaps best illustrated by the literature of the period.
Herman Melville, one of the towering figures of American letters, published this passage in 1850:
[W]e Americans are the peculiar, chosen people-the Israel of our time; we bear the ark of
the liberties of the world. Seventy years ago we escaped from thrall; and, besides our first
birthright-embracing one continent of earth-God has given to us, for a future inheri-
tance, the broad domains of the political pagans, that shall yet come and lie down under
the shade of our ark, without bloody hands being lifted. God has predestinated, mankind
expects, great things from our race; and great things we feel in our souls. The rest of the
nations must soon be in our rear. We are the pioneers of the world; the advance guard,
sent on through the wilderness of untried things, to break a new path in the New World
that is ours. In our youth is our strength; in'our inexperience, our wisdom. At a period
when other nations have but lisped, our deep voice is heard afar. Long enough have we
been sceptics with regard to ourselves, and doubted whether, indeed, the political Messiah
had come. But he has come in us, if we would but give utterance to his promptings. And
let us always remember that with ourselves, almost for the first time in the history of the
earth, national selfishness is unbounded philanthropy; for we cannot do a good to America,
but we give alms to the world.
H. MELVILLE, WHITE JACKET 151 (Grove Press ed. New York 1959) (1st ed. n.p. 1850).
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not see fit to do so. 179
This is not to say that repressive laws such as North Carolina's religious
test for office are inevitable in a democracy. The point is that the methods used
to prevent the enactment of such laws must be sensitive to the role religion plays
in a free society. It is not enough to fantasize about building an imaginary wall
between religion and government.18 0 As Neuhaus has noted:
Our question can certainly not be the old one of whether religion and
politics should be mixed. They inescapably do mix, like it or not. The
question is whether we can devise forms for that interaction which can
revive rather than destroy the liberal democracy that is required by a
society that would be pluralistic and free.' 8 1
B. The Importance of Transcendence
A little more than fifty years ago the Supreme Court said: "We are a Chris-
tian people, according to one another the equal right of religious freedom, and
acknowledging with reverence the duty of obedience to the will of God."' 8 2 In
1952 Justice Douglas, whose personal skepticism was no secret, observed that
"[w]e are a religious people whose institutions presuppose a Supreme Being."'18 3
Twentieth century statements such as these echo the sentiments of earlier
judges and scholars. With few exceptions, 184 nineteenth century observers of
the American experiment saw traditional, theistic religion as a positive influence
on political life. Justice Story believed "that piety, religion, and morality are
intimately connected with the well-being of the state, and indispensable to the
administration of civil justice."' 8 5 Alexis de Tocqueville thought that religion,
by diverting citizens from abject selfishness, made society strong "just at the
point where democratic peoples are weak."' 8 6 Thomas Cooley, whose treatise
on Constitutional Limitations187 was a standard reference work for decades, be-
lieved that government should "foster religious worship and religious institu-
tions, as conservators of the public morals, and valuable, if not indispensable,
assistants to the preservation of the public order."' 8 8 The state's dependence on
public morality-and the role of theistic religion in preserving that morality-
were taken for granted. Prohibitions against state churches were included in
some state constitutions, 18 9 but few people thought government should be relig-
179. See supra note 165 and accompanying text.
180. One constitutional scholar has noted that "a complete separation of all the affairs of the
state from any and all aspects of religion is possible only in the fevered imaginations of fanatics." D.
FELLMAN, THE LIMITs OF FREEDOM 42 (1959).
181. R. NEUHAUS, supra note 170, at 9.
182. United States v. MacIntosh, 283 U.S. 605, 625 (1931).
183. Zorach v. Clauson, 343 U.S. 306, 313 (1952).
184. See supra text accompanying note 71; infra text accompanying notes 191-96.
185. 3 J. STORY, supra note 12, § 1865, at 722.
186. A. DE TOCQUEVILLE, supra note 39, at 445.
187. T. COOLEY, CONSTITUTIONAL LIMITATIONS.
188. Id. at *471.
189. See W. TORPEY, supra note 76, at 16.
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iously neutral in any absolute sense of the term. 190
Among those few, however, were a handful of scholars and legal theorists
destined to leave an indelible mark on the history of American jurisprudence.
Thomas Jefferson believed that education could take the place of religion as the
guarantor of enlightened self-government.19 1 He shared the "anticlerical
presuppositions of the Enlightenment" 192 and was anxious to protect the new
government from the depredations of organized religion. 193 Jeremy Bentham,
John Stuart Mill, and Oliver Wendell Holmes, Jr., the patriarchs of utilitarian-
ism and legal realism, engaged in the historic struggle to distinguish law and
government from religion and sectarian morality.'9 4 Under their tutelage, many
lawyers and legal philosophers came to see religion as a private, personal mat-
ter,'9 5 existing quite apart from the "science" of law.
196
190. See id. at 16-17. When people like Justice Story spoke about religion's usefulness to govern-
ment, they naturally had a specific religion in mind: Christianity, or something very much like it.
See supra text accompanying note 12. Almost all of the early American religious tests restricted
public office to Christians of one sort or another. See W. TORPEY, supra note 76, at 16. Later, as
waves of immigration altered the demographic landscape, narrowly sectarian religious tests became
politically untenable. By the time Torcaso v. Watkins, 367 U.S. 488 (1961), was decided, existing
religious tests required little more than theism. See Note, Freedom of Religion, the Atheist, and the
Torcaso Case, 47 VA. L. REv. 315, 315 n.1 (1961).
191. See supra text accompanying note 71.
192. M. HOWE, THE GARDEN AND THE WILDERNESS 2 (1965).
193. See id.
194. See, eg., Holmes, The Path of the Law, 10 HARv. L. REV. 457, 459 (1897) (noting the
"confusion between morality and law"). In perhaps his most famous example, Justice Holmes at-
tempted to demonstrate that the duty to keep a contract has nothing to do with morality. Id. at 462.
195. Cf. Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602, 625 (1971) ("The Constitution decrees that religion
must be a private matter for the individual, the family, and the institutions of private choice."); H.
BERMAN, supra note 170, at 71-72 ("Christianity itself is losing its public character, its political and
legal dimension, and. . . is becoming 'privatized.' ").
The authors of a recent book on educational pluralism suggest that Jefferson's notion of separa-
tion of church and state was tied to his desire to create a climate in which his own "religion,"
Enlightenment rationalism, could prosper and eventually drive sectarian faiths from the public
arena. See R. MCCARTHY, J. SKILLEN & W. HARPER, DISESTABLISHMENT A SECOND TIME 26-27
(1982). The key to success in this endeavor was the privatization of traditional Christianity:
Jefferson's religion could function as the universal common denominator, in the public
realm if all other religious groups'admitted to its authority while remaining satisfied to
hold on to their own peculiar dogmas in a limited, private, nonuniversal realm. If other
religions would fade away entirely after their members were converted to the Jeffersonian
religion, then clearly Jefferson's hope would be fulfilled. But Jefferson's hope would be
realized almost as fully if other religions were. . . willing to live as peculiar "sects" among
other peculiar "sects" in an equal fashion, each recognizing in Jefferson's common rational
morality the framework which could integratethem all in a universal order. Each religious
group would then be free to hold its private dogmas without coercive support or impair-
ment, while Jeffersonians would be free to organize the universal order on a common,
rational, moral basis in the hope that gradually the peculiar "opinions" of the sects would
wither away under exposure to the light of reason.
Id. at 27.
Ironically, the theology of many Christian denominations made them particularly susceptible to
this kind of attack:
[Miost of the Christian gropps saw their special religious doctrines and practices as wholly
individual matters, involving their relationship to God, their personal relationships locally
and in the home, and the condition of their souls. It was not at all strange for them to
expect that in the larger realm of social and political order some general, universal moral
principles ought to hold. The public political arena was viewed by many Christians as a
primarily "secular" (this-worldly, not religious), rational, and natural arena. Thus Jeffer-
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The secularist jurisprudence of the late nineteenth and early twentieth cen-
turies transformed both legal education and the law itself. At most modem law
schools, the law is taught as if it were simply "a system of rules and techniques
for resolving disputes and solving social problems"; 197 its religious dimension
goes largely unnoticed, or at least unremarked. 198 In the courts, what began as
a few words in a letter from Jefferson to the Baptists of Danbury, Connecti-
cut' 99 -the famous "wall of separation" concept-has become a principle of
constitutional law.
The general public, however, has yet to be convinced. American values,
including legal values, remain firmly rooted in traditional religions. 2° Three-
quarters of the North Carolinians responding to a survey during the 1970s
agreed that "[h]uman rights come from God and not merely from laws."20 1 The
neo-evangelical politics of the 1980s are in part a response to what many per-
ceive as an undemocratic assault-often by judges-on traditional values, in-
cluding the notion of "God and country." North Carolina's religious test for
office remains formally intact not because anyone is eager to enforce it, but be-
cause of what its repeal would symbolize.20 2
Lately some legal scholars and social critics have reaffirmed the linkage
between traditional religion and democratic government. Harold Berman, for-
merly James Barr Ames Professor of Law at Harvard, has questioned whether
"the great principles of Western jurisprudence, 20 3 many of which are derived
from Christianity,2° 4 can withstand a continuing process of secularization. He
believes that "law and religion stand or fall together; if we wish law to stand, we
shall have to give new life to the essentially religious commitments that give it its
ritual, its tradition, and its authority.' '2 5 Richard John Neuhaus, writing in the
same vein, has raised the spectre of what he calls "the naked public square":20 6
When religious transcendence is excluded, when the public square has
son's principles for a universal morality could be accepted for that realm as long as they
were perceived as part of a rational philosophy rather than as part of a new religion.
Id. at 28. This is not to say that these Christian groups believed in separating their belief in divine
authority from political life. Jeffersonian rationalism included belief in a god that bears a striking
resemblance to the god of the American civil religion. See Bellah, supra note 75, at 9-10.
196. See Langdell, Teaching Law as a Science, 21 AM. L. REV. 123 (1887).
197. H. BERMAN, supra note 170, at 80.
198. The interaction of law and economics or law and politics-even, in rare instances, law and
philosophy-is cheerfully acknowledged, but few law school classroom discussions delve any deeper
than that.
199. Letter from Thomas Jefferson to Danbury Baptist Association (Jan. 1, 1802), reprinted in
XVI THE WRITINGS OF THOMAS JEFFERSON 281-82 (1905).
200. See R. NEUHAUS, supra note 170, at 21.
201. See id. at 81. President John F. Kennedy expressed the same idea in his 1961 inaugural
address, when he said: "[Tihe rights of man come not from the generosity of the state but from the
hand of God." Address by President Kennedy (Jan. 20, 1961), partially reprinted in Bellah, supra
note 75, at 3.
202. See supra note 165.
203. H. BERMAN, supra note 170, at 72.
204. See id. at 52-67.
205. Id. at 37.
206. R. NEUHAUS, supra note 170, at vii.
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been swept clean of divisive sectarianisms, the space is opened to seven
demons aspiring to transcendent authority....
[O]nce religion is reduced to nothing more than privatized con-
science, the public square has only two actors in it-the state and the
individual. Religion as a mediating structure-a community that gen-
erates and transmits values-is no longer available as a countervailing
force to the ambitions of the state. Whether in Hitler's Third Reich or
in today's sundry states professing Marxist-Leninism, the chief attack
is not upon individual religious belief. Individual religious belief can
be dismissed scornfully as superstition, for it finally poses little threat
to the power of the state. No, the chief attack is upon the institutions
that bear and promulgate belief in a transcendent reality by which the
state can be called to judgment.20 7
So perhaps Secretary Bennett was right. Perhaps the fate of American de-
mocracy really is "intimately intertwined . . . with the vitality of the Judeo-
Christian tradition, °20 8 or at least with some notion of transcendent authority.
William Gaston20 9 and many of his contemporaries 210 certainly thought so. But
even if one concedes Bennett's point, important questions remain: How can the
vitality of the Judeo-Christian tradition best be preserved? What rules should
govern the actions of religious people in a pluralistic democracy?
A constitution that includes or permits the enactment of a religious test for
office cannot provide a satisfactory answer. The United States Constitution,
however, provides a framework within which all citizens, regardless of their reli-
gious opinions, can compete for leadership of the political community. The fed-
eral Constitution guarantees free exercise of religion, 211 prohibits the
establishment of any particular religion,212 and forbids religious tests for of-
fice. 2 13 Implicit in this radical declaration of religious freedom is the framers'
recognition of religion's important but often problematic role in the political life
of a democratic society. Nowhere does the Constitution say anything about a
wall.
IV. BEYOND THE WALL OF SEPARATION
The Supreme Court's wall of separation jurisprudence has attracted a vari-
ety of critics over the years. In 1965 Harvard's Mark De Wolfe Howe faulted
the Court for its narrowly Jeffersonian approach to the establishment clause.2 14
More recently, Justice Rehnquist reviewed the legislative history of the first
207. Id. at 8-9, 82.
208. Address, supra note 1, at 1.
209. See supra text accompanying note 146.
210. See supra text accompanying notes 184-88.
211. U.S. CONST. amend. I.
212. Id.
213. Id. art. VI, § 3.
214. See M. HowE, supra note 192, at 1-3 1. Professor Howe characterized the Court's Jefferso-
nian interpretation as "[i]llusion bor  of oversimplification," id. at 8, because it ignored the antisecu.
larist approach to separation advocated by Roger Williams. See id. at 9.
[Vol. 641094
CHURCH AND STATE
amendment and found no justification for strict separationism.21 5 "It is impossi-
ble to build sound constitutional doctrine upon a mistaken understanding of
constitutional history," he wrote, "but unfortunately the Establishment Clause
has been expressly freighted with Jefferson's misleading metaphor for nearly
forty years." 2 16
Jefferson's letter to the Danbury Baptists literally refers to a "wall of sepa-
ration between church and state."'2 17 If the metaphor were taken to mean sim-
ply that the government may not set up a state church, few would quibble with
the choice of words. Metaphors are like balloons, however, and the Court has
not been shy about inflating this one.2 18 In cases involving the public schools,
for example, the Court has stated that separation of church and state requires
separation of religion from government, 2 19 and even separation of religion from
the process of lawmaking.220 The Court, in other words, has demanded the
impossible. 2 21
Futile attempts to divorce religion from politics and government have
wreaked havoc on the Court's establishment clause jurisprudence. Justice Jack-
son's post-World War II prophecy has come true: In its zeal to classify various
institutions and ideas as either religious or secular,222 the Court has made its
figurative wall of separation "as winding as the famous serpentine wall designed
by Mr. Jefferson for the University he founded. '223 A state may bus parochial
school students to and from the classroom, 224 but not to and from a museum.2 25
215. See Wallace v. Jaffree, 105 S. Ct. 2479, 2509-16 (1985) (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
216. Id. at 2509 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
217. Letter, supra note 199.
218. Cf. McCollum v. Board of Educ., 333 U.S. 203, 213 (1948) (Frankfurter, J., concurring)
("[1]he meaning of a spacious conception like that of the separation of Church from State is un-
folded as appeal is made to the principle from case to case.").
219. See, e.g., id. at 212 (majority opinion of Black, J.) ("[Tihe First Amendment rests upon the
premise that both religion and government can best work to achieve their lofty aims if each is left
free from the other within its respective sphere."); Everson v. Board of Educ., 330 U.S. 1, 31-32
(1947) (Rutledge, J., dissenting) (establishment clause was intended "to create a complete and per-
manent separation of the spheres of religious activity and civil authority by comprehensively forbid-
ding every form of public aid or support for religion").
220. See, e.g., Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602, 623 (1971) ("The history of many countries
attests to the hazards of religion's intruding into the political arena.").
221. See supra text accompanying notes 170-81.
222. The Court, for example, forbids government aid to "religious" schools but allows states to
support "secular" institutions. See, eg., Grand Rapids School Dist. v. Ball, 105 S. Ct. 3216 (1985);
Aguilar v. Felton, 105 S. Ct. 3232 (1985). This approach makes sense only in the context of what
might be described as a dualistic world view. If the Court supposes (as it does) that the activities of
individuals or institutions may be either religious or secular,
then the identification of church with religion and state with secular is a meaningful posi-
tion. But if one holds to a nondualistic. . . view of life, such an identification does not
correspond with that person's view of reality. ...
This latter perspective rests on the assumption that religion is not a thing in itself.
Religion is always intrinsic to the life of an individual or the identity of an institution. It is
impossible, from this perspective, to separate religion from life, to call one individual or
institution religious and another secular in the sense of nonreligious.
SOCIETY, STATE, & SCHOOLS, supra note 174, at 96-97.
223. McCollum v. Board of Educ., 333 U.S. 203, 238 (1948) (Jackson, J., concurring).
224. See Everson v. Board of Educ., 330 U.S. 1, 17 (1947).
225. See Wolman v. Walter, 433 U.S. 229 (1977).
1986] 1095
NORTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW
The government may lend the same students textbooks, 226 but may not lend the
school a map.227 As Justice Rehnquist wrote in 1985:
[I]n the 38 years since Everson our Establishment Clause cases have
been neither principled nor unified. Our recent opinions, many of
them hopelessly divided pluralities, have with embarrassing candor
conceded that the "wall of separation" is merely "a blurred, indistinct,
and variable barrier," which "is not wholly accurate" and can only be
"dimly perceived." 228
Some have charged that the Court, in its confusion, has driven a wedge
between government and those Americans who still believe in God.229 Certainly
the danger of such alienation exists. As long as the Court clings to its separa-
tionist metaphor and continues to treat religion as if it were the province of
people who belong to churches and send their children to sectarian schools, 230
religious traditionalists will be in peril. Attempts to build walls between govern-
ment and religion inevitably lead to barriers between government and particular
forms of religion. Theism, if only because it looks like what the Court generally
takes to be religion, will be particularly at risk.
Criticism of the Court's separationist jurisprudence does not necessarily im-
ply that every establishment clause decision since Everson v. Board of Educa-
tion231 has been wrong. Several, including the controversial school prayer
rulings of the 1960s, are eminently defensible.2 32 The Court, however, is not
likely to achieve consistency or fairness in its establishment clause cases until it
abandons the wall metaphor and adopts an approach that more accurately re-
flects American history and the role of religion in a democratic society.
Justice Rehnquist believes that "nothing in the Establishment Clause re-
226. See Board of Educ. v. Allen, 392 U.S. 236 (1968).
227. See Meek v. Pittenger, 421 U.S. 349 (1975).
228. Wallace v. Jaffree, 105 S. Ct. 2479, 2516 (1985) (Rehnquist, J., dissenting) (quoting Everson
v. Board of Educ., 330 U.S. 1, 16 (1947); Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602, 614 (1971); Tilton v.
Richardson, 403 U.S. 672, 678 (1971); Lynch v. Donnelly, 465 U.S. 668, 673 (1984)).
229. See, for example, SociaTY, STATE, & SCHOOLS, supra note 174, at 103:
The entanglement test represents the full fruition of the Enlightenment mind, and it is
expressed by the highest Court in the land. In the name of corstitutionality the entangle-
ment test forbids even the possibility that religious beliefs may enter the public arena and
cause "political strife". . . . [Thus], the Supreme Court has clarified itself into exposing
its basic bias. It has driven a theistic world-view . . . into the wilderness, far from the
public arena where only that which is "secular" may enter.
230. The Court, of course, has recognized the existence of nontheistic religions. See Torcaso,
367 U.S. at 495 n.1 1. Nevertheless, it persists in trying to divide the'world into secular and religious
individuals and institutions. As the Court's education decisions make abundantly clear, those indi-
viduals and institutions that can be identified with denominations, churches, or doctrinal statements
inevitably are classified as religious, and those that cannot be so identified are deemed secular and
therefore beyond the reach of the establishment clause. See supra note 222.
231. 330 U.S. 1 (1947).
232. The Court's decisions in Engel v. Vitale, 370 U.S. 421 (1962), and Abingdon School Dist. v.
Schempp, 374 U.S. 203 (1963), were correct insofar as they prohibited state endorsement of a partic-
ular form of religion. See infra text accompanying notes 238-41. The Court's rationale for these
holdings was faulty, however, to the extent that it was based on the wall of separation concept. See,
e-g., Schempp, 374 U.S. at 216-17. State-sponsored prayers and religious observances such as those
involved in Engel and Schempp are unconstitutional because they "convey a message that . . , a
particular religious belief is favored or preferred" by the state, Wallace v. Jaffree, 105 S. Ct. 2479,
2497 (1985) (O'Connor, J., concurring), not because they breach the separationists' mythical wall.
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quires government to be strictly neutral between religion and irreligion. ' ' 233 Jus-
tice Story said essentially the same thing early in the nineteenth century.234 The
framers of North Carolina's first state constitution completed their labors long
before the first amendment was adopted, but most of them would have agreed
that the government should favor Christianity and discourage "irreligion. ' '2 35
Justice Rehnquist's construction of the establishment clause nonetheless is
defective on at least two counts. First, it ignores the essentially religious charac-
ter of what he calls "irreligion." Atheism, for example, would presumably fall
into this disfavored category. But atheism may be just as religious as theism-
just as much an expression of an individual's convictions about the nature of
ultimate reality.23 6 Second, and more important, Justice Rehnquist's interpreta-
tion of the establishment clause opens the door to religious oppression. North
Carolina's current religious test for office appears to do nothing more heinous
than favor "religion" over "irreligion. ' '2 37
Among current members of the Supreme Court, Justice O'Connor's ap-
proach to the establishment clause seems to be the most promising:
[R]eligious liberty protected by the Establishment Clause is infringed
when the government makes adherence to religion relevant to a per-
son's standing in the political community. Direct government action
endorsing religion or a particular religious practice is invalid under
this approach because it "sends a message to nonadherents that they
are outsiders, not full members of the political community, and an ac-
companying message to adherents that they are insiders, favored mem-
bers of the political community."
The endorsement test does not preclude government from ac-
knowledging religion or from taking religion into account in making
law and policy. It does preclude government from conveying or at-
tempting to convey a message that religion or a particular religious
belief is favored or ipreferred. 238
Equality of standing in the political community is the crucial point. Justice
O'Connor's interpretation of the establishment clause prohibits the government
from favoring or disfavoring particular religious groups,239 including those that
embrace what traditionally has been called "irreligion." Consistently and
233. Wallace v. Jaffree, 105 S. Ct. 2479, 2520 (1985) (Rehnquist, J., dissenting). The establish-
ment clause, in Justice Rehnquist's view, merely prohibits government from "establishing a religion
or discriminating between sects." Id. (emphasis added).
234. See supra text accompanying note 12.
235. See supra text accompanying notes 49-76.
236. See supra notes 170-74 and accompanying text.
237. The federal Constitution's prohibition of religious tests, U.S. CONST. art. VI, § 3, has never
been made applicable to the states. See Torcaso, 367 U.S. at 489 n.l.
238. Wallace v. Jaffree, 105 S. Ct. 2479, 2497 (1985) (O'Connor, J., concurring) (quoting Lynch
v. Donnelly, 465 U.S. 668, 688 (1984) (O'Connor, J., concurring)).
239. See Lynch v. Donnelly, 465 U.S. 668, 687-89 (1984) (O'Connor, J., concurring). It must be
clear, of course, that the endorsement test is intended to ensure the fundamental political equality of
religiously identified individuals and groups, not the ultimate worth or propriety of their ideas. The
expression of those ideas is protected by the free speech clause, U.S. CONsT. amend. I, but legislation
would be next to impossible if government could not at some point choose between religious ideas.
1986] 1097
NORTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW
thoughtfully applied, this approach would protect the rights of religious minori-
ties while recognizing the important and intrinsic role played by religion in
American society.24° Surely the establishment clause requires no more-and no
less-than that.
V. CONCLUSION
Some religions may be better than others, but the Constitution cannot per-
mit some religions to be more equal than others in the eyes of the law. When a
democratic constitution distinguishes between religions in the distribution of
civil rights-as it does when it creates or permits a religious test for office-it
fails in one of its essential purposes: to create a framework within which the
majority can rule without riding roughshod over the fundamental rights of mi-
norities. Freedom of religion is one of those fundamental rights, and it should
be available on an equal basis to all.
The purpose of the establishment clause cannot be to protect government
from religious contamination. Instead, the establishment clause should be seen
as a complement to the free exercise clause-an ingenious device that enables
every individual, regardless of his or her religious opinions, to contribute on an
equal basis to the political life of the community. By the same token, religion
cannot be narrowly and conveniently defined in terms of belief in God or dogma
or ritual; it is the expression of every individual's deepest convictions, and it
exists at the heart of political culture.
The Court must resist pressure to put any group's God "back" in the Con-
stitution. This is no longer, if it ever was, a Christian country. The jurispru-
dence of two centuries ago is, in every sense of the word, history. Christianity,
Judaism, atheism, and all other forms of religion must be equal before the law so
that every citizen, now and in the future, will have an equal opportunity to bring
his or her religious vision to the tribunal of public opinion. Religious tests for
office and similar instruments of oppression and exclusion have no place in a free
society.
Even so, the Court must remember Justice Cardozo's admonition: "Meta-
phors in law are to be narrowly watched, for starting as devices to liberate
thought, they end often by enslaving it." 241 A wall of separation between the
institutions of church and state is one thing. But a wall of separation between
religion and government, religion and politics, or religion and law is a wall built
on an illusion.
240. For example, state-sponsored prayer in government schools would still be unconstitutional,
but nondiscriminatory aid to private schools, including sectarian institutions, probably would be
permitted. Thus, the inequities of the current system of school financing could be eliminated, see
SOCIETY, STATE, & SCHOOLS, supra note 174, even as the rights of religious minorities remained
protected. In addition, the Court would be freed of making specious distinctions between such
things as textbooks lent to children and maps lent to schools. See supra text accompanying notes
226-27.
241. Berkey v. Third Ave. R.R. Co., 244 N.Y. 84, 94, 155 N.E. 58, 61 (1926), quoted in Wallace
v. Jaifree, 105 S. Ct. 2479, 2517 (1985) (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
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